Cognitive bias approach to the acquisition of disjunction

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Inclusive and exclusive disjunction


(1) Ann ate an apple or a banana.


Inclusive and exclusive disjunction

- (1) Ann ate an apple or a banana.
 - a. Ann ate at least one of the two fruits. (Inclusive)
 - b. Ann only ate an apple, or she only ate a banana. (Exclusive)

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Deriving exclusive readings

In conversations, sentences can be strengthened with an implicature (Grice, 1975). Strengthening happens via negating utterances, alternative to the sentence (Horn, 1972).


Deriving exclusive readings

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Deriving exclusive disjunction

- (2) Ann ate an apple or a banana.
 - ALT: Ann ate both an apple and a banana.
 - → Ann did not eat both an apple and a banana.

Exclusive disjunction



Acquisition of disjunction

Adults frequently interpret disjunctions exclusively. Inclusive interpretation remains possible (Nicolae et al., 2024).

How do children interpret disjunction?

Childen and alternative-based reasoning

Since Noveck (2001) and Chierchia et al. (2001) a common assumption was that the ability to perform alternative-based reasoning develops late since **children were said to have the inclusive interpretation**.

Experimental evidence:




Adults X
Children

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
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


Singh et al. (2016) as well as Tieu et al. (2017) investigated the remaining cases and found that many children interpret disjunctions conjunctively.

Conjunctive readings

(3) Ann ate an apple or a banana.

 \rightsquigarrow Ann ate both the apple and the banana.



Empirical results (Singh et al., 2016, p.324)




Fig. 3 Comparing children's (n = 31) and adult (n = 26) mean scores on critical conditions (error bars indicate 95 % confidence intervals)

Empirical results (Tieu et al., 2017, p.139)





Figure 2 Percentage of *yes*-responses from children and adults to 1DT conditions (plain bars) and 2DT conditions (hashed bars), across disjunction types and languages.

Empirical results (Tieu et al., 2017, p.140)



Why do children interpret

disjunction as conjunction?

Null hypothesis

Hypothesis 1 (lexical misanalysis)

Children are genuinely confused between 'or' and 'and', as they play the same syntactic role.

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- 1. Children correctly reason with disjunction in some environments.

 (Pagliarini et al., 2018; Su, 2014)
 - (4) Ann did not eat apples or bananas.

 - → Ann did not eat apples and she did not eat bananas.

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Children are genuinely confused between 'or' and 'and', as they play the same syntactic role.

- 1. Children correctly reason with disjunction in some environments. (Pagliarini et al., 2018; Su, 2014)
 - (4) Ann did not eat apples or bananas.

 - → Ann did not eat apples and she did not eat bananas.
- Children can be forced to access the disjunctive meaning when evaluating incompatible disjuncts. (Bleotu et al., 2024)

Note on negated conjunctions

Children (and most adults) interpret conjunction under negation as disjunction:

- (7) Ann did not eat apples and bananas.
 - At least one kind of fruit was not eaten by Ann.
 - → Ann did not eat apples and she did not eat bananas.

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Language	NOT OR	NOT AND	Paper
English	$\neg p \wedge \neg q$	$\neg p \land \neg q$	(Notley et al.2016)
Japanese	$\neg p \land \neg q$	$\neg p \wedge \neg q$	(Goro & Akiba 2004; Goro 2007)
Mandarin	$\neg p \land \neg q$	$\neg p \wedge \neg q$	(Crain 2012, Notley et al.2016)
Turkish	$\neg p \land \neg q$	$\neg p \wedge \neg q$	(Goro 2007, Geçkin et al. 2016)
Italian	$\neg p \land \neg q$	$\neg p \wedge \neg q$	(Goro 2007, Geçkin et al. 2016)

Table 1: Children's interpretation of negated conjunction and disjunction.

Alternative-based approach

Proposal by Singh et al. (2016)

Hypothesis 2 (Singh et al., 2016)

Children derive the conjunctive meaning via alternative-based reasoning.

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Assumptions:

- 1. Children can perform (recursive) alternative-based reasoning.
- 2. Children are not aware that AND is an alternative to OR.
- 3. Children know the inclusive (logical) meaning of OR, but their alternative-based derivation leads to incorrect results because of (2.).


Step 1 Inclusive OR: Ann ate an apple or a banana.



Inclusive $A \ \mathrm{OR} \ B$


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Step 2 *ALT:* 1. Ann ate an apple. 2. Ann ate a banana.




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- **Step 1** Inclusive OR: Ann ate an apple or a banana.
- **Step 2** *ALT:* 1. Ann ate an apple. 2. Ann ate a banana.
- **Step 3** Mutual negation of alternatives:

ALT2: 1. Ann ate only an apple. 2. Ann ate only a banana.



- Step 1 Inclusive OR: Ann ate an apple or a banana.
- **Step 2** *ALT:* 1. Ann ate an apple. 2. Ann ate a banana.
- **Step 3** Mutual negation of alternatives: *ALT2:* 1. Ann ate *only* an apple. 2. Ann ate *only* a banana.
- Step 4 Negation of the alternatives:
 - \rightsquigarrow 1. Ann did **not** only eat A. 2. Ann did **not** only eat B.



Inclusive A or B

Not ALT 2

- Step 1 Inclusive OR: Ann ate an apple or a banana.
- **Step 2** *ALT:* 1. Ann ate an apple. 2. Ann ate a banana.
- **Step 3** Mutual negation of alternatives:

 ALT2: 1. Ann ate only an apple. 2. Ann ate only a banana.
- **Step 4** Negation of the alternatives:
 - → 1. Ann did **not** only eat A. 2. Ann did **not** only eat B.
- Step 5 Ann ate both an apple and a banana.



So Singh et al. (2016) propose that children know the meaning of disjunction, but use it only to go through a very complicated process to arrive at an incorrect conjunctive reading.

Moreover, children systematically and across languages choose that meaning over the inclusive reading.

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Predicted order of acquisition/simplicity:

INCLUSIVE ≾ CONJUNCTIVE ≾ EXCLUSIVE

Our proposal

Cognitive bias approach

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Neglect-zero bias (Aloni, 2022)

Speakers systematically neglect structures which verify the sentence by virtue of an empty configuration (*zero-models*).

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Neglect-zero bias (Aloni, 2022)

Speakers systematically neglect structures which verify the sentence by virtue of an empty configuration (*zero-models*).

Tendency to neglect zero-models follows from the difficulty of the
cognitive operation of evaluating truths with respect to empty
witness sets. [Nieder 2016, Bott et al, 2019]

Neglect-zero: illustration

- (8) Less than three squares are black.
 - a. Verifier: $[\blacksquare, \square, \blacksquare]$
 - b. Falsifier: $[\blacksquare, \blacksquare, \blacksquare]$
 - c. Zero-models: $[\Box, \Box, \Box]$; $[\blacktriangle, \blacktriangle, \blacktriangle]$;

Ignorance inferences of disjunction

Motivation¹:

Ignorance inference

(9) The prize is in the attic *or* in the garden.

→ the speaker doesn't know where

[Grice 1989]

 $^{^1}$ Neglect-zero bias can account for a range of phenomena involving disjunction, e.g., free choice and distributive inferences. We will not discuss these applications here.

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(10) ??I have two or three children.

→ the speaker doesn't know how many children they have.

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Conclusion: in a disjunction, both disjuncts need a (non-empty) witness set of possibilities.

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- (11) Ann ate an apple or a banana.
 - → The speaker does not know which fruit she ate.



Empty verifier

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Empty verifier

Non Empty verifier

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Empty verifier

Non Empty verifier

Illustrations

Ann ate an apple.

- Verifier: []
- Falsifiers: [≯], [³], [³]
- Zero-models: none

Ann ate a banana.

- Verifier: [
]
- Falsifiers: [**•**], [**•**], []
- Zero-models: none

Illustrations

Ann ate an apple.

- Verifier: []
- Falsifiers: [≯], [³], [³]
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Ann ate an apple **and** a banana.

- Verifier: [♥ፉ]
- Falsifiers: [♥], [३], []
- Zero-models: none

Ann ate a banana.

- Falsifiers: [**•**], [**•**], []
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Illustrations

Ann ate an apple.

- Verifier: [♥]
- Falsifiers: [🔊], [🌖], []
- Zero-models: none

Ann ate an apple **and** a banana.

- Verifier: [♥ፉ]
- Falsifiers: [♥], [◊], [⟩
- Zero-models: none

Ann ate a banana.

- Falsifiers: [♥], [♦], []
- Zero-models: none

- Verifier: ?
- Falsifiers: [3], []
- Zero-models: [♥]; [⅄]

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Ann ate a banana.

- Verifier: [
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- Falsifiers: [**⑤**], [**⑤**], []
- Zero-models: none

- Verifier: [♥ | →]
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- [*]; [*] are **zero-models** because they verify the sentence by virtue of an empty witness for one of the disjuncts.

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- Verifier: [
]
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- [*]; [*] are **zero-models** because they verify the sentence by virtue of an empty witness for one of the disjuncts.
- Ignorance effects arise because such zero-models are cognitively taxing and therefore disregarded (neglect-zero bias).

Novel hypothesis: no-split

Illustrations

- a. "Split" verifier: [● | 🍌]
- b. Conjunctive Verifier: [♥ፉ]
- c. Falsifier: [3]
- d. Zero-models: [♥]; [᠕]

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Hypothesis 3

Children have conjunctive readings as they (similarly to adults) neglect zero and, unlike adults, do not have the ability to split.

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Hypothesis 3

Children have conjunctive readings as they (similarly to adults) neglect zero and, unlike adults, do not have the ability to split.

- The "split" state in (12-a) involves the entertainment of two alternatives, also a cognitively difficult operation;
- We conjecture that the ability to split states is acquired late.
- The combination of neglect-zero and **no-split bias** can explain non-classical inferences observed in pre-school children.

(13) Ann ate an apple **or** a banana.

Deriving ignorance



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(13) Ann ate an apple or a banana.

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Deriving conjunctive reading



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Deriving conjunctive reading

$$[\circlearrowleft]$$
 OR $[\!\!\!\nearrow]$ $\stackrel{NZ}{\Longrightarrow}$ $[\circlearrowleft]$ + $[\!\!\!\nearrow]$

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
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$$[\overset{\bullet}{\bullet}] \text{ OR } [\overset{\checkmark}{\Rightarrow}] \overset{NZ}{\Longrightarrow} [\overset{\bullet}{\bullet}] + [\overset{\checkmark}{\Rightarrow}] \Longrightarrow [\overset{\bullet}{\bullet} \overset{\checkmark}{\Rightarrow}].$$

Predicted order of acquisition/simplicity:



Empty verifier

Non Empty verifier



(15) The squirrel is at the top or at the bottom of the tree.

→ The squirrel is at the top and at the bottom of the tree.

(Bleotu et al., 2024)

Mutually Exclusive Possibilities

 $[\uparrow]$ or $[\downarrow]$

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Mutually Exclusive Possibilities

$$[\uparrow]$$
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$$[\uparrow] \text{ OR } [\downarrow] \stackrel{NZ}{\Longrightarrow} [\uparrow] + [\downarrow] \Longrightarrow [\uparrow\downarrow] \#$$

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Mutually Exclusive Possibilities

$$[\uparrow] \text{ OR } [\downarrow] \stackrel{NZ}{\Longrightarrow} [\uparrow] + [\downarrow] \Longrightarrow [\uparrow\downarrow] \# \stackrel{SPLIT}{\Longrightarrow} [\uparrow \ | \ \downarrow].$$


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Mutually Exclusive Possibilities

$$\begin{picture}(t) \put(0,0){\line(0,0){1.5ex}} \put(0,0){\line(0,0){1.5ex}}$$



Redshaw & Suddendorf, 2016

(Phillips and Kratzer, 2024)

Note on BSML

 We formally model the biases using Bilateral state-based modal logic (BSML): our theory makes clear predictions: for instance, it predicts equivalence of disjunction and conjunction under negation.

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- But, each bias can be lifted at a cost of cognitive effort, to achieve a more logically precise interpretation (Kahneman et al., 1982).
- BSML offers formal tools to represent the unbiased (literal) and biased (pragmatic) meaning of sentences.
- The biases correspond to model-theoretical restrictions on the complexity of considered models.

Predictions regarding Free Choice inferences

(FC) You are allowed to eat an apple or a banana.

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Cochard et al. (2024)'s empirical results confirm that a sub-group of children has the conjunctive reading of Free choice (CFC).

Conclusions

- 1. Children sometimes (but systematically) interpret disjunctions conjunctively.
- 2. We proposed a cognitive bias approach to explain this phenomenon.
- Our approach predicts that the conjunctive interpretation is a simplification and should be acquired before the inclusive interpretation.
- 4. We predict and explain conjunctive free choice, which is difficult to explain for the alternative-based approaches.

Predicted order of acquisition/simplicity:

Thank you!

Aloni (2022)'s logic of information states

BSML clauses define logic equivalent to classical modal logic:

$$M, s \models p \text{ iff } \forall w \in s : V(w, p) = 1$$

 $M, s \models p \text{ iff } \forall w \in s : V(w, p) = 0$

$$M,s\models \neg\varphi \text{ iff }M,s\models\varphi.$$

$$M, s = \neg \varphi \text{ iff } M, s \models \varphi.$$

$$M, s \models \varphi \lor \psi \text{ iff } \exists t, t' : t \cup t' = s \& M, t \models \varphi \& M, t' \models \psi.$$

$$M, s = \varphi \lor \psi \text{ iff } M, s = \varphi \text{ and } M, s = \psi.$$

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Aloni (2022) adds the following atom to make the logic non-classical:

$$M, s \models \text{ ne iff } s \neq \emptyset.$$

$$M, s =$$
 NE iff $s = \emptyset$.

Disjunction in BSML


$$M,s\models\varphi\vee\psi\text{ iff }\exists t,t':t\cup t'=s\ \&\ M,t\models\varphi\ \&\ M,t'\models\psi$$

Pragmatic enrichment: $[\varphi \otimes \psi]^+ = ([\varphi]^+ \otimes [\psi]^+) \wedge \text{NE}$

Disjunction in BSML

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
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
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Note that now formulas denote sets of information states, and not sets of possible worlds.

Restrictions



References i

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